Niels Jensen: Can China Pull a Rabbit Out of a Hat

Thursday, February 3rd, 2011

This post is a guest contribution by Niels Jensen*, chief executive partner of London-based Absolute Return Partners.

Many moons ago, long before I joined Goldman Sachs, a London based employee of the firm went to Chicago to attend a seminar on options and futures. This goes back to the 1970s when proper men still wore hats, and our friend was indeed proper, so he showed up in Chicago in full British-style attire, including his beloved woollen hat. Lo and behold, Chicago can be a very windy place and, shortly after arriving in the Windy City, his hat blew off and was completely flattened by a passing car.

Our friend thought it reasonable that Goldman reimbursed him for his loss so, after having acquired a new hat, the cost found its way to the expense report, which he submitted on his return to London. In those days Goldman was quite a small firm, and expenses were controlled with an iron fist by one very senior person in New York, who shall remain unnamed. When he saw the expense report, he went ballistic and immediately demanded for our friend to re-submit his expenses, this time without the hat.

Now, our friend was not giving in that easily. He was truly upset about the loss and only found it fair that Goldman compensated him, so he re-arranged his expenses, with the total adding up to the exact same amount, but the hat had mysteriously disappeared. Then he wrote in big fat letters across the expense report: “Find the Hat!”

For reference only
Fast forward to China anno 2011. I suspect there is not one but many hats hidden in the national accounts of China and, thanks to Wikileaks, we now have a very public figure admitting as much. In a leaked 2007 cable Li Keqiang, who is the favourite to become the next premier, confided that official Chinese GDP figures are “man made” and “for reference only” (surprise, surprise), and that one should rather look at alternative measures such as electricity consumption, rail freight volumes and bank lending, if one wants a true picture of economic growth in China.

So let’s do precisely that. In chart 1 below I have plotted Chinese GDP growth against the electricity output over the past 15 years, and an interesting pattern emerges. During periods of low economic growth (the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, the US recession in 2001 and the global credit crisis in 2008-09), GDP grows much faster than the electricity output. Conversely, during periods of strong economic growth (2002-07 and 2010), GDP growth is lower than the power output. Clearly the GDP numbers are massaged.

Chart 1:  Chinese GDP vs. Electricity Consumption

Digging one level deeper reveals something rather more serious. Assuming the electricity stats tell the true story, and that the GDP numbers are ‘for reference only’ (remember, not my words!), China’s economy experienced a dramatic slowdown as 2010 progressed (see table 1). Total power consumption (year on year) grew by a whopping 22.7% in Q1 last year but only by 5.5% in Q4.  The slowdown in Q4 was in fact so dramatic that the power output dropped 6.3% quarter on quarter! There were some restrictions in place on the use of electricity in Q3 and Q4 which did have some impact, but those restrictions were dropped in November, so it cannot be the only explanation. This story is largely ignored by the sell-side banks, most of whom have no interest in offending their new pay masters.

Inflation is taking off
Turning to inflation, a similar picture emerges. According to the official stats, Chinese consumer price inflation moderated to 4.6% in December, down from 5.1% in November. However, anecdotal evidence suggests a much more serious problem, in particular in the largest cities, where actual inflation is running close to 20% according to my sources.

Click here for the full report.

* Niels Jensen has 26 years of investment banking, private banking and asset management experience. He founded Absolute Return Partners LLP and is its chief executive partner.

Source: Niels Jensen, Absolute Return Partners LLP, February 2011.

Tags: Absolute Return, Alternative Measures, British Style, China, Electricity Consumption, Executive Partner, Expense Report, Freight Volumes, Gdp Figures, Gold, Goldman Sachs, Iron Fist, Li Keqiang, Many Moons, New Hat, Niels Jensen, Options And Futures, Passing Car, Rail Freight, Return To London, Surprise Surprise, Windy Place
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Mental Midgets and Moral Pygmies

Thursday, December 10th, 2009

This post is a guest contribution by Niels Jensen*, chief executive partner of London-based Absolute Return Partners.

I have arrived at the fourth and final letter in our series about macro themes likely to shape the future. The topic this month is the role of the consumer; the fact that he has over-extended himself financially in recent years and the implications of that. Please allow me to start with a disclaimer: this topic is so vast that I cannot possibly cover every aspect of it. One area which I don’t touch on, for example, is the effect lower consumer spending will have on corporate earnings. Also, I fully accept that not all countries are as leveraged as the UK and the US; the following is predominantly a discussion about the Anglo-Saxon model. Accept the letter in that spirit and you should enjoy it.

Up to the neck in debt

It is really quite simple. The problem is leverage – leverage at every level of the economy. The consumer is up to his neck in debt, but so are our banks and our governments (or, at the very least, they soon will be). In the US (chart 1a), total leverage has risen from a post World War II level of about 150% of GDP to roughly 350% of GDP today with households and the financial sector responsible for most of that growth. Meanwhile, in the UK (chart 1b), total leverage has grown from 200% of GDP to a mind-boggling 500% of GDP in little over 20 years with households and financial companies also accounting for most of that growth.

Chart 1a: Total US debt as % of GDP

Source: Deutsche Bank

So, while it is true that governments on both sides of the Atlantic are currently taking on potentially dangerous amounts of debt, it is not quite true that they are behind the excessive creation of debt over the past few decades. If anything, they should be accused of naivety, ignorance and perhaps even stupidity for allowing the current situation to develop in the first place.

Midgets and pygmies

Now, why didn’t anyone see this coming? Why did our ‘midget’ leaders permit leverage to grow out of control? Well, as a starting point, it is important to understand that, from the consumer’s point of view, increasing leverage has been a logical response to the lower macro-economic volatility experienced over the past 25-30 years. As demonstrated by Dr. Woody Brock at SED (chart 2), household income has become much more stable in recent years with volatility on personal income being cut in half when compared to the 70s and by almost 80% when compared to the 40s. As a consumer, it is perfectly rational to increase financial leverage if you experience rising income stability. What is less rational is to take it to the extreme, as both US and UK consumers have done in the past 6-7 years (note how the slope of the US debt-to-income ratio in chart 2 steepens post year 2000).

Chart 2: Development of US household debt

Source: Strategic Economic Decisions, Inc.

Click here for the full report.

* Niels Jensen has 25 years of investment banking, private banking and asset management experience. He founded Absolute Return Partners LLP and is its chief executive partner.

Source: Niels Jensen, Absolute Return Partners LLP, December 8, 2009.

Tags: 1a, Absolute Return, Anglo Saxon, Consumer Spending, Corporate Earnings, Current Situation, Dangerous Amounts, Deutsche Bank, Executive Partner, Financial Sector, GDP, Governments, Growth Chart, Households, Leverage, Mental Midgets, Niels Jensen, Stupidity, T Touch, World War Ii
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Niels Jensen: The Hamster on the Wheel

Thursday, September 3rd, 2009

This post is a guest contribution by Niels Jensen*, chief executive partner of London-based Absolute Return Partners.

It is not universally appreciated, but the last 25-30 years have, in general, been staggeringly good to most investors. Technology induced productivity enhancements combined with favourable demographic trends, minimal government involvement, accommodating labour unions and the globalisation of international trade have all contributed to a benign inflation environment and strong economic growth, leading to arguably the biggest bull market of all times in both bonds and equities.

So much for the good news. The long lasting tail winds have finally turned around, and we now face, and will most likely continue to face, head winds for years to come. The list is long, but some of the most important factors contributing to this change include:

The demise of the Anglo-Saxon consumer driven growth model:

The Anglo-Saxon consumer is exhausted; he has over-extended himself and must reduce his debts for years to come. This may shift the powers from West to East, but only if Asia can drum up sufficient domestic demand to replace the western consumer.

The shift from small to big government:

Ever since Reagan and Thatcher stated that small is beautiful, at least as far as government is concerned, investors across the western world have benefited. Now, with most OECD countries suffering the implications of the worst crisis since the Great Depression, small is out and big is back in. This has dramatic implications for tax, productivity and hence also for corporate profits.

An ageing population:

Baby boomers (those born between 1945 and 1960) are now retiring in large numbers and will continue to do so for the next 15 years or so, with all sorts of negative implications. As the experience from Japan shows, an ageing population slows down economic growth and becomes a drain on public finances at a time where we can least afford it.

Dwindling energy supplies:

Evidence is growing that the world’s largest oil producers either cannot or will not maintain oil supplies at levels sufficient to support continued economic expansion. The facts are few and far between in the world of oil, but there is plenty of circumstantial evidence to suggest that the oil markets are getting tighter and tighter.

In a series of articles over the next few months I will tackle these issues one by one, as they are all critically important. I open this month with an essay on oil. In March 2004, when crude oil was trading just below $30, I predicted $100 prices within the next decade. Please note I made that prediction way before Goldman Sachs made the same projection, for which they got the whole world to sit up and listen. Before I get too carried away, though, it should not be forgotten that Woody Brock, our economic adviser, inspired me to make the $100 projection back in 2004. Likewise, new research from Woody has inspired me to write this month’s letter.

Click here for the full report.

* Niels Jensen has 24 years of investment banking, private banking and asset management experience. He founded Absolute Return Partners LLP and is its chief executive partner.

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Make Sure You Get This One Right

Friday, July 3rd, 2009

This post is a guest contribution by Niels Jensen*, chief executive partner of London-based Absolute Return Partners.

As investors we are faced with the consequences of our decisions every single day; however, as my old mentor at Goldman Sachs frequently reminded me, in your life time, you won’t have to get more than a handful of key decisions correct – everything else is just noise. One of those defining moments came about in August 1979 when inflation was out of control and global stock markets were being punished. Paul Volcker was handed the keys to the executive office at the Fed. The rest is history.

Now, fast forward to July 2009 and we (and that includes you, dear reader!) are faced with another one of those “make or break” decisions which will effectively determine returns over the next many years. The question is a very simple one:

Are we facing a deflationary spiral or will the monetary and fiscal stimulus ultimately create (hyper) inflation?

Unfortunately, the answer is less straightforward. There is no question that, in a cash based economy, printing money (or “quantitative easing” as it is named these days) is inflationary. But what actually happens when credit is destroyed at a faster rate than our central banks can print money?

Let’s begin by setting the macro-economic frame for the discussion. I have been quite bearish for a while, suspecting that the growing optimism which has characterised the last few months would eventually fade again as reality began to sink in that this is no ordinary recession and that “less bad” doesn’t necessarily translate into a quick recovery. I still believe there is a good chance of enjoying one, maybe two, positive quarters later this year or early next; however, a crisis of this magnitude doesn’t suddenly fade into obscurity, just because the economy no longer shrinks at an annual rate of 6-8%.

Click here for the full report.

* Niels Jensen has 24 years of investment banking, private banking and asset management experience. He founded Absolute Return Partners LLP and is its chief executive partner.

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Tags: 24 Years, Absolute Return, Banki, Central Banks, Defining Moments, Deflationary Spiral, Executive Office, Executive Partner, Fiscal Stimulus, Global Stock Markets, Goldman Sachs, Good Chance, Investment Banking, Life Time, Niels Jensen, Obscurity, Paul Volcker, Printing Money, Rest Is History, Single Day
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Green Shoots or Smoking Weed?

Monday, June 1st, 2009

This post is a guest contribution by Niels Jensen*, chief executive partner of London-based Absolute Return Partners.

Asset bubbles are strange animals. Ideally, you would like to punch the air out of them early before they become a real danger but, in practice, it is not quite so simple. Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan have actually both argued that asset bubbles cannot be detected and monetary policy should therefore not in any way be used to offset suspected bubbles.

I am not sure I agree with the two gentlemen, but that is less relevant for now. What is important to understand is what happens once the asset bubble bursts. In my experience, almost all post-bursting bubbles share two characteristics:

1) At the very least, asset prices revert to the mean, although many actually overshoot on the downside.

2) A long (and often painful) period ensues, where asset prices gradually claw back lost value. History suggests that this period is measured in years and sometimes in decades; never have asset prices recovered from a deflated bubble in just a matter of months.

The recent collapse of residential property prices – at this point still more advanced in the US than in Europe – is a classic asset bubble which is now deflating. The reason I have decided to write about it this month is because the “green shoot” campaigners are missing a hugely important point about the effect that falling US property prices are going to have – not just on the US but also on the global economy.

Recovery will prove temporary

Make no mistake. I always expected and continue to expect an economic revival later this year, which unfortunately will prove temporary. There are many good reasons to expect such a short-term recovery, as I discussed in detail in the April issue of this letter. However, it is what happens afterwards that I worry about. The economic uplift is likely to last no more than one or two quarters after which we will have to face more gloom and doom.

There are at least two reasons property prices are so important to the overall economy. The first reason has to do with leverage. There has been a lot of talk about de-leveraging in recent months, and the consensus seems to be that most of it is now behind us. Perhaps, in the narrowest possible sense, that is correct.

But leverage is not confined to hedge funds and banks. Many private households run heavily levered balance sheets as a result of their home ownership and it is this leverage that is rapidly growing at the moment. Why is that? Because leverage is a function of both the numerator and the denominator and, as American home owners are about to find out for the first time, falling property prices can have a devastating effect on your balance sheet.

Secondly, property wealth has become an important part of many people’s lives. In both the US and the UK (and in numerous other countries as well) many people have directed their savings towards property in recent years, and no small part of the profits have been recycled into the economy through equity withdrawal schemes. This has created a level of consumption which cannot be sustained if property prices do not continue to rise.

Click here for the full report.

* Niels Jensen has 24 years of investment banking, private banking and asset management experience. He founded Absolute Return Partners LLP and is its chief executive partner.

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Tags: Absolute Return, Alan Greenspan, Asset Prices, Ben Bernanke, Bubble Bursts, Bursting Bubbles, Campaigners, Economic Revival, Economic Uplift, Executive Partner, Global Economy, Gloom And Doom, Important Point, Many Good Reasons, Niels Jensen, Painful Period, Smoking Weed, Strange Animals, Two Gentlemen, Value History
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The $33,000,000,000,000 question

Friday, May 8th, 2009

This post is a guest contribution by Niels Jensen*, chief executive partner of London-based Absolute Return Partners.

Is the crisis really over?
Commercial paper spreads have come down dramatically. Libor rates are (hmm – almost) back to normal. Even high yield spreads are narrowing. It certainly appears as if the credit crisis is well and truly over or, at the very least, the light which most of us think we can see at the end of the tunnel is no longer that of an oncoming freight train.

No wonder equities are currently enjoying one of their best spells ever. And while equities continue to go up and up, most of us are left scratching our heads. Is this the real thing or will it go down in history as ‘just’ another bear market rally? Not so long ago, the entire financial system stared Armageddon in the face. Now, only a few months later, equity markets behave as if all the worries of yesterday have been washed away. How is that possible?

The great bank illusion
The current bull market began in earnest in the second week of March, but what really got everyone going were the surprisingly good Q1 US bank earnings which were reported during the first half of April. Most commentators interpreted the numbers as the clearest piece of evidence yet that we are now firmly on the road to recovery.

Of course US banks made good money in Q1. The environment created for them is the equivalent of the US government reducing the cost of goods to zero for its embattled car manufacturers and then going on to buy – courtesy of the US tax payer – a couple of million cars that nobody really needs. Even Detroit would make money given those conditions!

Liquidity is trapped
The problem for the rest of us is that the banks are not sharing the candy they have been handed. Much of the liquidity created by the central banks remains trapped in the financial sector. Quite simply, the multiplier is not doing its job, as many banks prefer to hoard cash rather than increase lending at this juncture.

This is both good and bad news at the same time. Good because it implies that we probably do not have to worry too much about the inflationary effect of the aggressive monetary easing currently taking place; bad because it means that the economy is not going to kick back to life as quickly as everyone would like – and expect

Meanwhile investors are growing cautiously optimistic about the GDP outlook for the second half of the year with many now forecasting modest growth – at least in the United States. Only a fool would suggest that GDP would shrink by 5-10% per quarter in perpetuity, as has been the case over the past two quarters. The economic slowdown is now decelerating and, as I pointed out last month, there are good reasons why we may see a temporary lift in economic activity later this year, but it will almost certainly prove transitory.

Click here for the full report.

* Niels Jensen has 24 years of investment banking, private banking and asset management experience. He founded Absolute Return Partners LLP and is its chief executive partner.

Tags: Absolute Return, Armageddon, Bear Market, Car Manufacturers, Central Banks, Commentators, Credit Crisis, Executive Partner, Financial Sector, Freight Train, high yield, Hoard Cash, Job Banks, Libor Rates, liquidity, Market Rally, Million Cars, Multiplier, Niels Jensen, Tax Payer, Us Bank
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Europe on the Ropes

Thursday, March 5th, 2009

This post is a guest contribution by Niels Jensen*, chief executive partner of London-based Absolute Return Partners.

Many of today’s policy proposals start from the view that “greed” and “incompetence” and “poor risk assessment” are the ultimate source of what went wrong. In fact, they were not the true cause at all. Moreover, even if they had been, it is fatuous to think that we will now create a post-crash generation of bankers and traders who are not greedy, much less a new generation of quants who will be able to assess and manage risks much better than “the idiots” who have brought us to the current abyss. Greed cannot be exorcised. Nor can the inherent inability of any quants to determine the “true” probability distributions of all-important events whose true probabilities of occurrence can never be assessed in the first place.”

Woody Brock, SED Profile, December 2008

Policy mistakes “en masse”
The last few weeks have had a profound effect on my view of politicians (as if it wasn’t already dented). All this talk about capping salaries for senior bank executives is quite frankly ridiculous. It is Neanderthal politics performed by populist leaders. That Gordon Brown has fallen for it is hardly surprising but I am disappointed to see that Barack Obama couldn’t resist the temptation. The mob wants blood and our leaders are delivering in spades. The stark reality is that we are all guilty of the mess we are now in. For a while we were allowed to live out our dreams and who was there to stop us? Policy mistakes – very grave mistakes – permitted the situation to spin out of control. From the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank under the stewardship of Alan Greenspan being far too generous on interest rates to the British Chancellor of the Exchequer – who now happens to be our Prime Minister – advocating ‘Regulation Light’.

Policing must improve
If you really want to prevent a banking crisis of this magnitude from ever happening again, the focus should be on the way banks operate and not on how much they pay their staff. And, within that context, any discussion must start and end with how much leverage should be permitted. The French have actually caught onto that, but their narrow-mindedness has driven them to focus on hedge funds’ use of leverage which is only a tiny part of the problem. It is the gung ho strategy of banks which brought us down and which must be better policed. And guess what; if banks were better policed – and leverage restricted – then profits, even at the best of times, would be much smaller and there would be no need to regulate bankers’ compensation packages.

It is pathetic to watch our prime minister attacking the bonus arrangements of our banks when the UK Treasury, on his watch, spent £27 million pounds on bonuses last year as reward for delivering a public spending deficit of 4.5% of GDP at the peak of the economic cycle. Even my old mother understands that governments must deliver budget surpluses in good times, allowing them more flexibility to stimulate when the economy hits the wall. What Gordon Brown has done to UK public finances in recent years is nothing short of criminal.

So, with that in mind, let’s take a closer look at the European banking industry. The following is not pretty reading. I have rarely, if ever, felt this apprehensive about the outlook. So, if the crisis has made you depressed already, don’t read any further. What is about to come, will make your heart sink.

More leverage in Europe
Let’s begin our journey by pointing out a regulatory ‘anomaly’ which has allowed European banks to take on much more leverage than their American colleagues and which now makes them far more vulnerable. In Europe, unlike in the US, it is only risk-weighted assets which matter to the regulators, not the total leverage ratio. European banks can therefore apply a lot more leverage than their US counterparties, provided they load their balance sheets with higher rated assets, and that is precisely what they have been doing.

That is fine as long as you buy what it says on the tin. But AAA is not always AAA as we have learned over the past 18 months. Asset securitisations such as CLOs proved very popular amongst European banks, partly because they offered very attractive returns and partly because Standard & Poors and Moodys were kind enough to rate many of them AAA despite the questionable quality of the underlying assets.

Now, as long as the economy chugs along, everything is dandy and the AAA-rated assets turn out to be precisely that. But we are not in dandy territory. Many asset securitisation programmes are in horse manure to their necks, so don’t be at all surprised if European banks have to swallow further losses once the full effect of the recession is felt across Europe. The two largest sources of asset securitisation programmes are corporate loans and credit cards. Senior secured loans are still marked at or close to par on many balance sheets despite the fact they trade around 70 in the markets. The credit card cycle is only beginning to turn now with significant losses expected later this year and in 2010-11.

Not much of a cushion left
Citibank has calculated that it would only take a cumulative increase in bad debts of 3.8% in 2009-10 to take the core equity tier 1 ratio of the European banking industry down to the bare minimum of 4.5%. By comparison, bad debts rose by a cumulative 7% in Japan in 1997-98. One can only conclude that European banks are very poorly equipped to withstand a severe recession. Seeing the writing on the wall, they are left with no option but to shrink their balance sheets. Despite talking the talk, banks will use every trick at their disposal to reduce the loan book. No prize for guessing what that will do to economic activity.

The wheels are coming off
But that is not the whole story. It is not even the most worrying part of the story. For the true horror to emerge, we need to turn to Eastern Europe for a minute or two. Nowhere has the credit boom been more pronounced than in Eastern Europe. And nowhere is the pain felt more now that credit has all but dried up. One measure of the credit fuelled bonanza is the deterioration of the current account across the region. Credit Suisse has calculated that in four short years, from 2004 to 2008, Eastern Europe’s current account went from +6% to -6% of GDP. That is a frightening development and is likely to cause all sorts of problems over the next few years.

Meanwhile Western European banks, eager to milk the opportunities in the East after the iron curtain came down, have acquired many of the region’s banks (see chart 1). Now, with many Eastern European countries in free fall, ownership could prove disastrous for an already weakened banking industry in the West.

Chart 1: Western European Ownership of Eastern European Banks

Source: FT.com

The problem is widespread
To make matters worse, the problems in the East are beginning to look systemic. Credit Suisse has produced an interesting scorecard where they rank a number of countries around the world on factors usually taken into consideration when assessing the credit quality of sovereign debt (see chart 2). At the top of the tree (i.e. the worst credit score) you find Iceland – hardly surprising considering their current predicament. More importantly though, of the next 14 countries on the list, 8 are Eastern European – not what you want to hear if you are an already undercapitalised European bank with huge exposure to Eastern Europe.

Swedish banks are already reeling from their exposure to the Baltic countries. Austrian banks are in even worse shape, having been the most acquisitive of any European banks. Some Italian banks could be dragged under by their Eastern European exposure and even the conservative banking sector in Switzerland doesn’t look like it can escape the mayhem.

Worst of all, the problems in the East are just about to unfold at a point in time where the European banking industry is bleeding heavily from massive losses already incurred in other areas. With no access to private funding, banks find it virtually impossible to re-build their capital base with anything but tax payers’ money.

US banks are in less of a pickle. Unlike the subprime debacle which hit both the US and the European banks hard, US banks have little exposure to Eastern Europe. To prove my point, according to the IMF, European banks have 75% as much exposure to US toxic debt as American banks, but 90% of all cross border loans to Eastern Europe originate from Western European banks. And, to add insult to injury, European banks have been much slower than US banks in terms of recognising their losses. Write-offs now total about $750 billion in the US and only about $325 billion in Europe.

Chart 2: Country Vulnerability Scorecard

Click here for a larger image.

The great mortgage show
The problems in Eastern Europe begin and end with their large external debts. In recent years, ordinary people all over the region have converted their traditional mortgages to EUR- or CHF-denominated mortgages. Some have even switched to JPY mortgages. Who can possibly resist 3% mortgages? Didn’t anyone inform them of the risk? As currencies across the region have fallen out of bed in recent months, these mortgages have suddenly become 30-50% more expensive. No wonder the local economy is suddenly tanking.

Chart 3: Eastern Europe’s Net Foreign Liabilities as % of GDP

Credit Suisse has calculated that net foreign liabilities (as a % of GDP) have risen from 47% to 65% in recent months as a direct result of the loss of local currency values (see chart 3 – and don’t ask me why Credit Suisse has included South Africa in Eastern Europe!).

Chart 4: Eastern European versus Asian Crisis

Source: Wall Street Journal

Back in 1997-98 Asia went through a similar currency crisis. However, as you can see from chart 4, Asian current account deficits were much smaller than Eastern European deficits are now. So were debt levels. Despite that, the Asian crisis did enormous damage to the local economy. Eventually Asia came good, primarily because the devalued currencies allowed the Asian countries to export more. Eastern Europe does not share this luxury. With over 90% of the world’s GDP in recession, who are they going to export to anytime soon?

Austria is in greatest trouble
According to the latest estimates from BIS, Eastern European countries currently borrow $1,656 billion from abroad, three times more than in 2005 and mostly denominated in foreign currencies (ouch!). 90% of that can be traced to Western European banks. About $350 billion must be repaid or rolled over this year. Not an easy task in these markets. Austrian banks alone have lent about $300 billion to the region, equivalent to 68% of its GDP according to the Financial Times. A default rate of 10% on its Eastern European loans is considered enough to wipe out the entire Austrian banking system. EBRD has gone on record stating that defaults in Eastern Europe could end up as high as 20%.

An extra $250 billion to the IMF
Hungary, Latvia and Ukraine have already received emergency loans from the IMF and both Serbia and Romania are reportedly considering asking for help. Meanwhile the IMF’s coffers are draining quickly and it has asked leading industrial nations for new funding. At their summit a week ago, EU leaders coughed up an extra $250 billion but nobody said where the money is going to come from. Even if they find the money, it is likely to prove hopelessly inadequate. Our leaders must grow up. Measuring everything in billions is so yesterday. Trillions are the new billions, like it or not.

Conspiracy or…?
On the 11th February the Daily Telegraph’s Brussels correspondent Bruno Waterfield wrote an article under the header: “European banks may need £16.3 trillion bail out, EC document warns.” In the article, the reporter revealed that he has seen a secret document produced by the EU Commission which briefed the union’s finance ministers on the true extent of the banking crisis. Less than 24 hours later, the article’s header was changed to “European bank bail-out could push EU into crisis” and two paragraphs had mysteriously disappeared. Here they are:

“European Commission officials have estimated that “impaired assets” may amount to 44pc of EU bank balance sheets. The Commission estimates that so-called financial instruments in the ‘trading book’ total £12.3 trillion (13.7 trillion euros), equivalent to about 33pc of EU bank balance sheets.

In addition, so-called ‘available for sale instruments’ worth £4trillion (4.5 trillion euros), or 11pc of balance sheets, are also added by the Commission to arrive at the headline figure of £16.3 trillion.”

Do yourself a favour – read those two paragraphs again. Newspaper editors do not change content light-heartedly. Did the Telegraph editor receive a call from Downing Street? Or Brussels? Did he have second thoughts about the avalanche that he could possibly instigate? I don’t know and I probably never will. But one thing is certain. If the EU Commission’s estimate of £16.3 trillion of impaired assets is correct, then the crisis is far worse than any of us could ever imagine. Not only would we have to get used to the prospects of a systemic meltdown of our banking system, but entire nations may go down as well.

Public debt to rise and rise
Even if actual losses prove to be much, much smaller (and I sincerely hope so), the banking sector cannot, in the current environment at least, raise sufficient capital to stay afloat, so more, possibly a lot more, tax payers’ money will have to be put forward. This can only mean one thing. Public debt will rise and rise. The official estimate for the UK for next year is already approaching 10% of GDP, an estimate which will almost certainly rise further. We probably have to get used to running 10-15% deficits for a few years, a fact which seriously undermines the notion of government bonds being next to risk-free.

BCA Research has calculated the effect on public debt in a number of countries, as a result of further bank losses being underwritten by tax payers. Obviously, those countries with the largest banking industries (as a % of GDP) will be hit the hardest (see charts 5a and 5b).

Chart 5a & 5b: Eastern Europe’s Net Foreign Liabilities as % of GDP

For that very reason, and as pointed out in last month’s Absolute Return Letter, there is a real risk that investors will demand much higher risk premiums on government debt. Only a few days ago, Ireland issued 3-year bonds at almost 250 basis points over corresponding Bunds. As more and more debt is transferred to sovereign balance sheets, we will likely see the spreads between good and bad paper rise further but we will also witness increasingly desperate measures being applied by the men in power. If they could prohibit short-selling of banks on the stock exchange (which didn’t work), why wouldn’t they consider prohibiting short-selling of government bonds? Not that it would necessarily work any better, but desperate people do desperate things.

Can Germany rescue us?
Most investors remain convinced that Germany will come to the rescue – in my opinion not as simple a solution as widely perceived given the enormity of the crisis. One possible solution which has been mentioned frequently in recent weeks is for all the eurozone nations to get together and start issuing joint bonds. This would undoubtedly help the weaker nations, but the idea was shot down by the German Finance Minister only a few days ago when he said that closer economic harmony across the eurozone would be needed before Germany would be prepared to entertain such an idea.

The most obvious trick left in the book, therefore, is to inflate us out of this mess. With the enormous amounts of public debt being created at the moment, years of deflation a la Japan would be catastrophic. You will never get a central banker to admit to it, but a healthy dose of inflation is probably our best prospect of surviving this crisis. Given this outlook, do you really want to be long euros?

* Niels Jensen has 24 years of investment banking, private banking and asset management experience. He founded Absolute Return Partners LLP and is its chief executive partner.

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Do BRICs (and Germans) Eat PIGS?

Saturday, February 7th, 2009

This post is a guest contribution by Niels Jensen*, chief executive partner of London-based Absolute Return Partners.

When the euro was introduced about ten years ago, the pessimists didn’t give it much chance of reaching its tenth anniversary. The euro, or so the argument went, was doomed from the outset because of the disparity in economic performance amongst the member countries. In this respect not much has changed. At one end of the scale you still have the highly disciplined, but also slow growing, economies of Germany and the Netherlands; at the other end you find faster growing but ill disciplined countries such as Spain and Greece. As icing on the cake, you also have countries that lack in both departments, such as Italy, making it difficult for the union to ‘gel’ – well, according to sceptics.

There is admittedly an embedded weakness in the way the European currency union is structured. In the United States, arguably the largest currency union in the world, fiscal transfers between member states allow for the federal government to adjust for variances in economic performance. There is no such mechanism within the eurozone, which explains why the member states are subject to a number of rules. These rules require strict fiscal discipline. The problem is that few countries play by the rules.

The best example of this is the huge spread in the rise of unit labour costs over the past few years. Unit labour costs measure labour (wage) costs adjusted for changes in productivity. It is probably the best measure that exists in terms of tracking the changes in competitiveness between nations. The currency union is governed by the so-called Stability and Growth Pact. There is no mention of unit labour costs in the pact which, with the benefit of hindsight, is a major mistake. Even Jean-Claude Trichet, the Head of the European Central Bank, who rarely admits mistakes, has publicly stated that if he could design the currency union all over again, he would push for a unit labour cost stability pact.

Back to the early sceptics. What they failed to realise was that Europe, together with the rest of the world, was about to enter a period of unprecedented prosperity. The good times would not only gloss over the  deeper problems, but the euro would actually go from strength to strength to a point where it now threatens to unseat the US dollar as the premier reserve currency of the world. It will be a mystery to some of you, then, why one should question the longer term viability of the euro. That is nevertheless what I intend to do.

Click here for the full letter.

* Niels Jensen has 24 years of investment banking, private banking and asset management experience. He founded Absolute Return Partners LLP and is its chief executive partner.

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