European Stability

Groundhog Day: Will September’s Sell-off Repeat?


Tuesday, August 21st, 2012

by Russ Koesterich, Chief Investment Strategist, iShares

Come September investors might feel as if they are trapped in their own version of Groundhog Day. Last year, the Dow dropped 6% in September. Given the month’s consistently negative bias and lingering headline risks, there is a reasonable chance markets will come under pressure again this year.

While investors often pay too much attention to the calendar, September is the notable exception. Looking at data on the Dow Jones Industrial Average, which stretches back to 1896, September has historically been the worst month of the year, with an average return of slightly worse than negative 1%. This is the only month of the year for which the seasonal bias is so great as to be considered statistically significant.

The tendency for markets to fall in September is also evident when you look at the win rate – how often equities move higher. The win rate in September is barely 40%, versus nearly 60% for the other 11-months. Finally, this phenomenon is not limited to the United States. September has historically been the worst month of the year in a number of European markets – including Germany and the United Kingdom, as well as in Japan.

In addition to a negative seasonal bias, there are three other reasons to be concerned about the headline risk to the markets in the coming weeks:

  • On September 12, the German Constitutional Court will rule on the constitutionality of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Investors currently expect a favorable ruling, so any other outcome is likely to be disruptive.
  • The Netherlands holds an election, also on September 12. This is risky for markets as the outcome may very well be a fragmented government, which will call into question the commitment of the Dutch to further fiscal integration and their support for the southern European countries.
  • Closer to home, the US Federal Reserve will begin two days of deliberation on September 12 about the economy and monetary policy. Many investors are still expecting, or at least hoping for, an extension of the Fed’s quantitative easing program, but there is considerable scope for disappointment should the central bank stand pat.

In addition to headline risk, there has been a growing complacency in global equity markets. This trend is particularly evident when looking at implied volatility, or the VIX Index. In mid-August the VIX went below 15, well below its long-term average. While there are several technical reasons that the VIX is this low, it should still concern investors. A low VIX reading indicates weak demand for put protection, suggesting that investors are not particularly concerned with downside protection. Previous readings in this vicinity – in March of 2012 and the spring of 2011 – coincided with short-term tops.

How should investors position their portfolios? While I still prefer equities over the long-term, this is probably a reasonable time to consider trimming back on positions and looking for instruments that offer the potential for downside protection. One way to achieve this is to re-allocate from a cap-weighted exposure into a minimum volatility fund, or other instruments which tend to have a lower market beta.

For investors looking for global exposure, I like the iShares MSCI ACWI Index Fund (NYSEARCA:ACWI), the iShares MSCI All Country World Minimum Volatility Index Fund (NYSEARCA:ACWV), or the iShares S&P Global 100 Index Fund (NYSEARCA:IOO).

Source: Bloomberg

Russ Koesterich, CFA is the iShares Global Chief Investment Strategist and a regular contributor to the iShares Blog. You can find more of his posts here.

The author is long IOO.

In addition to the normal risks associated with investing, international investments may involve risk of capital loss from unfavorable fluctuation in currency values, from differences in generally accepted accounting principles or from economic or political instability in other nations. Emerging markets involve heightened risks related to the same factors as well as increased volatility and lower trading volume. Minimum volatility funds may experience more than minimum volatility as there is no guarantee that the underlying index’s strategy of seeking to lower volatility will be successful.
Index returns are for illustrative purposes only. Indexes are unmanaged and one cannot invest directly in an index.

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Extraordinary Strains (Hussman)


Sunday, July 22nd, 2012

 

by John Hussman, Hussman Funds

Just weeks after the enthusiasm over Europe’s plan to plan for the possibility of using the European Stability Mechanism to bail out Spanish banks, the subtle technicality – that direct bailouts would make all of Europe’s citizens subordinate to even the unsecured bondholders of Spain’s banks – has predictably deflated that enthusiasm. On the growing recognition that addressing Spain’s banking problem will mean taking those banks into receivership, wiping out unsecured debt (much of which unfortunately was sold to unknowing Spanish savers as secure “savings” vehicles), and having the Spanish government sort out the damage, Spanish 10-year debt plunged to new lows last week (see chart below), and Spanish yields hit fresh Euro-crisis highs. At the same time, interest rates in Germany, Finland, Holland, Denmark and Switzerland all moved to negative levels looking 2-5 years out. The world is paying these governments to lend money to them, because the only way to acquire other default-free, non-commodity assets is to hire armored trucks and secure vaults to take delivery of physical currency. This set of conditions is not normal or sustainable, and indicates extreme credit market strains in Europe.

The Euro also hit a fresh 2-year low last week at 1.21, just a shade above its 2010 crisis low of 1.20. Likewise, the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds dropped to 1.45%, matching the historic low it reached a few weeks ago. Yields were higher even in the depths of the Great Depression, when the S&P 500 was trading at less than 2 times the pre-Depression level of earnings, the Shiller P/E on 10-year normalized earnings was less than 5, and the S&P 500 was yielding 16%. As a side note, many analysts seem almost woozy at the “incredible value” that supposedly exists in stocks because the 2.3% yield on the S&P 500 exceeds the 1.45% yield on 10-year Treasuries. It’s worth pointing out that prior to the point that inflation took off after 1960, the yield on the S&P 500 exceeded the yield on Treasury bonds in fully 93% of the data.

Keep in mind that once you subtract out the necessary compensation for default risk (which is rapidly increasing in Spain, for example), interest rates represent the value that the economy places on time. Long-term interest rates have plunged to record lows, and real interest rates are negative after inflation. What interest rates are telling you; what the Federal Reserve is telling you; what the equilibrium created by lenders and borrowers is telling you – is that time is economically worthless and that economic malaise will extend for years.

This does not reflect a well-functioning economy. To the contrary, if you look across history and across nations, strong prospects for sustained economic growth are typically accompanied by high real interest rates, because the demand for capital is robust and good ideas have to compete for funding. Interest rates are an indication of both the demand for loans and the incentive to save. It is not “stimulative” to depress interest rates in an environment where households, businesses and governments are desperately trying to reduce debt. That policy may insult the value of time enough to deter people from saving, and to reduce the immediate penalty for assuming even larger amounts of debt (as the U.S. government continues to do), but it should be clear that these actions move the economy further from a sustainable equilibrium, not closer to it.

I do expect that it will be possible to navigate the coming years well, but it will not be by locking in negligible yields and depressed risk premiums in the futile hope that one plus one will end up being something other than two. Prospective returns vary a great deal over the course of the market cycle, and the strategy of varying risk exposure in proportion to the prospective compensation for that risk will be essential.

On the economic front, as we expected based on leading economic evidence, new orders and order backlogs have dropped abruptly in recent reports. These indices are short-leading indicators of production, which is likely to show a striking decline beginning in the July data. Note carefully whether any positive surprises are in May and June data, because these reports will still be mixed. I continue to expect negative employment changes in the coming months, though as I’ve noted before, we may only find this out later on revisions rather than the initial prints in real-time. In any event, I am convinced that we will ultimately learn that the U.S. economy, slightly trailing the global economy, entered a new recession in June.

While July components are still coming in, the chart below shows the most recent condition of coincident U.S. economic data, reflecting a variety of Fed surveys and Purchasing Managers surveys.

The key question – in view of extreme credit market strains in Europe, and accelerating economic deterioration in the U.S. – is why the S&P 500 continues to trade within a few percent of its April bull market high. The answer is simple: investors are scared to death of missing the widely anticipated market advance that they expect to follow a widely anticipated third round of quantitative easing. Good economic news may be a relief for investors, but bad economic news in this context is just as much of a relief because it brings forward the anticipated delivery date of the sugar. The follow-up question, however, is that if more QE is widely anticipated, and a market advance is widely anticipated to result, isn’t that the precise definition of an event that is already priced into the market?

If you look at the Federal Reserve’s own research on quantitative easing – large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) – nearly every paper emphasizes the “portfolio balance” effect. Put simply, as the Fed removes longer-term Treasury securities from the menu of portfolio choices available to investors, it forces investors to consider alternative securities, raising their prices and lowering their yields – with a particular impact in driving down the risk premiums of risky securities. Indeed, as we’ve noted, QE has generally been effective in helping stocks to recover the peak-to-trough loss that they have suffered in the prior 6-month period (though the most recent LSAPs in the UK and Europe have been failures in that regard).

Still, once risk premiums are already deeply depressed (we estimate the likely 10-year prospective total nominal return for the S&P 500 to be only 4.8% annually), once stocks are trading near their bull market highs, and once Treasury debt already sports the lowest yield in history, should investors really expect much of a portfolio-balance effect from further attempts at QE? Frankly, I doubt it, but in the eventuality of a third round of QE, we’ll focus on our own measures of market action – not on any blind faith in the Fed.

The more troubling issue is that Fed papers on the effectiveness of QE focus almost singularly on the effect of QE on interest rates and risk premiums in the financial markets, with the notable absence of any analysis of the resulting effect on the real economy. This is like showing that squirting gas into an engine will make the engine run faster, without any concern for the fact that there is no transmission that connects the engine to the wheels. In a nutshell, the problem with QE is the lack of any material transmission mechanism from monetary interventions to real economic activity. This is a problem that the Fed should have recognized years ago, because there is strong and consistent historical evidence that real economic activity has very weak “elasticity” with respect to financial market fluctuations, particularly in equity values. Invariably, a 1% change in the value of the stock market is associated with a change of just 0.03-0.05% in GDP, and even that change is transitory. What the Fed has been doing is little but bubble-blowing, while at the same time driving the global financial system further from equilibrium rather than toward it.

Unfortunately, I expect these efforts to continue, but I also expect that it will be useless in averting an unfolding global recession. If the Fed was to initiate a third round of QE near present levels, it would likely be disappointing in the sense that it would fail to reverse economic weakness and at the same time would fail to drive equity prices higher than they already are, or interest rates materially lower than they already are. This would damage confidence in the Federal Reserve and force it to resort to language about monetary policy working with “long and variable lags.” Moreover, at a 1.45% yield and an 8-year duration on a 10-year bond, any interest rate increase of more than about 18 basis points a year will now produce a negative total return for the Federal Reserve over the period that the bonds are held, which comes at public expense (reducing the amount of interest that the Fed would otherwise turn over to the Treasury). As a result, talk is presently much cheaper than action. It seems likely that another round of QE will await obvious economic weakness and a significant spike in risk premiums – probably best measured by the depth of the drawdown in the S&P 500 from its most recent 6-month peak. Still, given that the rationale for much higher risk premiums is very real, it’s not clear that QE will have durable effects on stocks even in that event.

In short, a broad array of observable evidence suggests extraordinary strains in Europe, and abrupt though expected deterioration in U.S. economic activity. The Federal Reserve certainly has policy options, but those options have no material transmission mechanism to the real economy. We’ve always viewed the Federal Reserve as having an important and legitimate role in providing liquidity to the banking system in the event of heavy withdrawals; creating new reserves in return for high-quality, default-free securities backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. This remains an important role, but the Fed’s actions have gone far beyond this role into areas that distort financial markets without transmission to economic activity. That’s just a reality we have to accept, and we’ll respond to further interventions with particular attention to trend-following measures of market action.

Here and now, we remain defensive in the face of accelerating strains the global economy – new highs in Spanish yields, negative interest rates across more stable European countries, new lows in the Euro and U.S. Treasury yields, collapsing new orders and backlogs, a sudden plunge in the employment component of the Philly Fed index, collapsing M2 velocity, and other factors. Due to some modest interest-rate considerations, our estimates of prospective return/risk have improved negligibly from the most negative 0.5% of historical observations, and are now among the most negative 0.8% of historical data. This rare extreme keeps us on red alert for now.

Market Climate

As noted above, accelerating strains are evident both in the global economy – particularly Europe – and in the U.S. economy. Stock valuations remain stretched on the basis of normalized earnings. Profit margins are nearly 70% above their historical norms at present, but these margins reflect very high deficit spending and very weak savings rates – something that can be related to corporate profit margins through accounting identities. Unless one anticipates continued deficits indefinitely, either revenues will revert closer to the level of labor compensation, or less likely, labor compensation will increase toward the level of revenues, but in any event the gap will tend to narrow. This may not be an immediate outcome, but stocks are instruments with an effective duration of over 40 years (mathematically, the duration of stocks is essentially equal to the price-dividend ratio, regardless of growth rates or repurchases). The very long-term stream of cash flows matters enormously in asset valuation.

One of the immediate issues I have with stocks here is the “exhaustion syndrome” (see Goat Rodeo) that has re-emerged in recent weeks. Examining the rare past instances of this syndrome, in 1961, 1987, 2000, and early-2008 among others, the key feature is a breakdown in measures of market action from an overvalued, overbought extreme, followed by a recovery rally toward the prior high and accompanied by earnings yields below their level of 6-months earlier. Normally, the recovery carries the market back to the prior “line” of support that surrounds the peak. The emergence of this exhaustion syndrome may seem benign or unimportant, but it has historically been an important precursor of major market declines. Given what are already significant challenges for both the economy and for the prospective return/risk tradeoff in stocks, my concerns about the potential for deep market losses remain elevated.

Investors often have the impression that the market simply collapses once a bull market peak is set, but this isn’t typical. What is typical is exactly the sort of exhaustion pattern we’ve observed since April. To illustrate this, the chart below presents market behavior around several market peaks that were also followed by an exhaustion syndrome as we observe today. The bull market peaks are aligned at 1.0. The remaining scale is set as a fraction of that peak. Time is measured in trading days before and after the bull market peak. Note that after a quick initial decline from the bull market peak, it’s typical for the market to recover much of the lost ground before the downside progress continues, in some cases producing the “exhaustion syndrome” that we presently observe. Exhaustion syndromes can go on for several weeks, but have historically been very dangerous advances to trade, because more often than not, there is a bear market just behind them. This was not the case in three instances: the July 1998 instance – followed by a decline of only 18%, the July 1999 instance – down only 12% over the next several months, and of course the instance in late January of this year, which occurred at about 1326 on the S&P 500 and still hasn’t yet resolved into losses beyond the weakness we saw in May. It’s possible that the market outcome will be benign in this case, and that the market will go on to set further bull market highs. We have no intention of taking that improbable gamble in the face of present headwinds.

Strategic Growth and Strategic International continue to be fully hedged, with a staggered-strike option position in Strategic Growth (which raises the strike prices of the put side of our hedge). We presently estimate the time-decay or “theta” of the staggered-strike position at about 0.25% of assets monthly – which we are willing to accept based on the extremely negative outcomes that are typical of the current climate, and the expectation that we will not remain in this position for a long time. Strategic Dividend Value is hedged at about 50% of the value of its stock holdings, and Strategic Total Return continues to carry a duration of just over one year, with about 10% of assets in precious metals shares and a few percent of assets in utility shares and foreign currencies.

 

Copyright © Hussman Funds

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George Soros: New Year, Same Crisis


Friday, January 27th, 2012

New Year, Same Crisis

by George Soros, Soros Fund Management, via Project Syndicate

DAVOS – The measures introduced by the European Central Bank last December, especially the Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO), have relieved the liquidity problems of European banks, but have not cured the financing disadvantage of the highly indebted member states. Since high-risk premiums on government bonds endanger the capital adequacy of banks, half a solution is not enough. Indeed, that supposed solution leaves half the eurozone relegated to the status of Third World countries that have become highly indebted in a foreign currency. Instead of the International Monetary Fund, it is Germany that is acting as the taskmaster imposing tough fiscal discipline on them. This will generate both economic and political tensions that could destroy the European Union.

I have proposed a plan that would allow Italy and Spain to refinance their debt by issuing treasury bills at around 1%. I named it in memory of my friend Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa, who, as Italy’s central banker in the 1990’s, helped to stabilize that country’s finances. The plan is rather complicated, but it is legally and technically sound. I describe it in detail in my new book Financial Turmoil in Europe and the United States. European authorities rejected my plan in favor of the LTRO. The difference between the two schemes is that mine would provide instant relief to Italy and Spain. By contrast, the LTRO allows Italian and Spanish banks to engage in a very profitable and practically riskless arbitrage, but has kept government bonds hovering on the edge of a precipice – although the last few days brought some relief.

My proposal is to use the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to insure the European Central Bank against the solvency risk on any newly issued Italian or Spanish treasury bills that it may buy from commercial banks. This would allow the European Banking Authority to treat these various T-bills as the equivalent of cash, because they could be sold to the ECB at any time. Banks would then find it advantageous to hold their surplus liquidity in the form of T-bills as long as these bills yielded more than bank deposits held at the ECB. Italy and Spain would then be able to refinance their debt at close to the ECB’s deposit rate, which is currently 1% on mandatory reserves and 25 basis points on excess-reserve accounts.

Read the complete article here

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Temporary European Rescue Fund to be Replaced by (Bigger) Permanent European Rescue Fund


Tuesday, February 15th, 2011

by Trader Mark, Fund My Mutual Fund

This is getting little play in the U.S. but as moral hazard runs rampant the world over (make a mistake? run your government into the ground? banking sector gone wild? no worries – that is what taxpayers are for)….. the temporary European Rescue Fund (named European Financial Stability Facility – EFSF) is going to be replaced by a much larger permanent rescue fund in 2013.  Partially funded by my fellow Americans (via IMF).  To which we say – you’re welcome.  The new rescue fund shall be named the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)… I love acronyms, they make bailouts sound so warm and cuddly.

Per Spiegel Online

  • Euro-zone finance ministers have agreed to effectively double the volume of the euro rescue fund from 2013 when it becomes a permanent mechanism. The fund will have an effective lending capacity of 500 billion euros, said Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker.
  • Euro-zone finance ministers meeting in Brussels on Monday agreed that a permanent rescue mechanism to be set up from 2013 would total €500 billion euros ($675 billion) — significantly higher than the current rescue fund.
  • The new fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), will be part of a package of measures European leaders are hoping to agree at two summits in March to resolve the debt crisis.  Apart from the euro zone, the ESM would also get cash from the International Monetary Fund ….
  • The ESM is intended to replace the temporary euro rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which was hurriedly set up in May to avert a collapse of the single currency in the wake of the Greek debt crisis.
  • The EFSF currently has a volume of €440 billion but can only lend up to €250 billion to ailing euro member states because it has to keep a large cash buffer in order to maintain top credit ratings. Juncker said the ESM’s €500 billion would be the “effective lending capacity” of the new rescue fund.

But don’t worry – it could get even bigger if need be.  No taxpayer must be spared if there is someone to bail out…

  • EU officials are worried that the current fund may not be big to cope if Portugal and Spain were to follow Greece and Ireland in needing a bailout.

Germany of course is trying to preach responsibility but they might as well be from the planet Mars.  Fiscal sanity does not drive consumption or push stock markets up.

  • Germany is opposing an immediate increase in the EFSF unless other euro zone member states agree to cut public spending and make their economies more competitive.
  • Germany’s ” competitiveness pact“, supported by France, includes higher retirement ages, a German-style “debt brake” to limit government bond issuance, a common corporate tax base and an end to inflation-linked wages. But other euro-zone countries are resisting the proposal.

Copyright (c) Trader Mark, Fund My Mutual Fund

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Economy and Bond Market Highlights


Sunday, February 28th, 2010

The Economy and Bond Market

Consumer confidence took a dive this month, highlighting the fragile nature of the economic recovery. Most of the economic news out this week from consumer confidence, to housing and concerns regarding European stability had a negative bias to it.

Consumer Confidence Index Monthly Charge 02-26-10

Strengths

  • Fed Chairman Bernanke reiterated his view that record low interest rates would be maintained for some time while the economy recovers from the recession.
  • Fourth-quarter GDP, fueled by business spending, was revised higher to 5.9 percent from 5.7 percent.
  • The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the emergency fiscal stimulus created more than 2 million jobs and boosted the economy more than many had expected.

Weaknesses

  • New home sales hit a new record low, falling to just 309,000 annualized units.
  • Existing home sales were also weak, falling 7.2 percent in January.
  • Weekly initial jobless claims rose to 496,000 and hit the highest level in three months. This is a sign the economic recovery remains uneven.

Opportunities

  • If financial markets are a good mechanism for discounting the future, the future appears relatively robust. The markets have been able to shake off bad news relatively easily this week, probably a good sign for the economic recovery.

Threats

  • If one of the eurozone countries were to seriously threaten default, the whole eurozone system comes into question and threatens global financial stability.

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