Greek Referendum: The Latest Reactions from JPMorgan, RBC, Barclays, and DB

Here is the rundown of posits from JPMorgan, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, and RBC, in the wake of Sunday's Greek referendum:

JPMorgan's Malcom Barr with the bank's latest take on Greece which is that at this point, a Grexit is JPM's "base case"... and it only goes downhill from there.

After the "big no", euro exit is our base case

  • After the “big no” it is now a race between two forces: political pressure for a deal, versus the impact of banking dysfunction within Greece
  • Although the situation is fluid, at this point Greek exit from the euro appears more likely than not

Early indications of the official result suggest the result is a “No” by a comfortable margin. What happens next?

First, it will be important to see the tone of the immediate political responses both within Greece and outside. We would expect the tone to be somewhat more conciliatory on both sides. Hollande and Merkel are to meet tomorrow night to discuss the issue, and as we understand it, the Eurogroup is scheduled to meet on Tuesday. We expect that a split is likely to emerge in the coming days.  The Commission and France (and possibly others) will argue that negotiations should resume immediately with an aim of finding agreement. Others will find it more difficult to return to negotiations with a newly emboldened Tsipras in short order.

In the German case, for example, the Bundestag has to be consulted before Mr Schauble can enter into discussions about a new program for Greece (as requested on 30th June). However, the Bundestag has just broken for summer recess, so any such vote will require a recall. We have seen reports that talks at a technical level between Greece and the creditors may restart tomorrow (Monday), but we can imagine that the Bundestag will express its displeasure if it feels those discussions are in-progress without their express consent.

Second, there are reports of an emergency meeting between the ECB, Bank of Greece and Finance Ministry tonight, and at the latest the ECB will likely have to take a decision about ELA support tomorrow (if not tonight). Our base case is that the ELA total will simply be rolled on a day-to-day basis for now. It is extremely difficult for the ECB to justify increasing the region's exposure to Greece at this point. That effectively means that the Greek banks are likely to run increasingly short of cash, and the acceptability of electronic forms of payments will diminish rapidly.

The Bank of Greece and Finance Ministry has a joint committee working to prioritize payments out of Greece for essential imports. There are reports, however, that suggest the logistical problems arising from these procedures are biting. Importers are facing delays in seeing their requests to make purchases processed. And Greek exporters are finding it hard to get payment in euros from those they sell to, as their customers do not want to hold any euro balances within the Greek banking system. It is difficult to get a sense of the scale of these issues at this point. But our best guess is that these issues will multiply in the days ahead.

This suggests that what we see next will be a race between two forces: political pressure to move toward an agreement despite resistance from a number of northern European parliaments, versus the increasingly unpleasant implications of a dysfunctional banking system on the other. This latter force is unpredictable: it may manifest itself in pressure on the government to stand down, or it may generate a more unified “siege mentality” within Greece. The July 20th payment of €3.5bn to the ECB as Greek bonds mature creates one possibly fixed point as we look forward, but our sense is that could be dealt with via a number of mechanisms if political talks are progressing (transfer of SMP profits, short-term ESM loan, for example).

Our base case is that the pressures coming from a dysfunctional banking system in Greece will shorten the time horizon to negotiate a deal to a handful of weeks. As that pressure builds, there is likely to be a temptation to call a referendum in Greece on euro membership, and for the state to begin issuing I-O-Us or similar and giving these some status as legal tender. To the extent that pensioners and public sector employees find themselves being paid with such instruments, it takes the banks further away from solvency (they have liabilities in euros, but will have loans to individuals being paid or receiving “i-o-u” s which will be worth a lot less). Meanwhile, we expect at least some countries in the rest of the region (not least Germany) will not hurry over the design of a new program, and will find it difficult to get parliamentary assent for any such program.  

This is a path that suggests to us that there is now a high likelihood of Greek exit from the euro, and possibly under chaotic circumstances. Perhaps the rest of the region will agree to a reasonably quick deal, or the ECB will raise ELA enough to retain minimal viability in the payments system. Perhaps the pressures of dysfunctional banks will force Mr Tsipras to stand down, and a deal is subsequently made. But for now, we would view a Greek exit from the euro as more likely than not.

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Here's the latest from .

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From Barclays:

A “no” vote means EMU exit, most likely

We argue that an EMU exit would become the more likely scenario, even if Greece remaining in the euro area cannot be ruled out. Agreeing on a programme with the current Greek government would be extremely difficult for EA leaders, given the Greek rejection of the last deal offered. EA leaders accepting all Greek proposals would be a difficult sell at home, especially at the Bundestag or in Spain ahead of the general elections.

How will the crisis play out? The bank liquidity crisis is likely to turn into a solvency crisis once the ECB shuts down ELA, probably no later than 20 July (when a EUR4.2bn payment to the ECB becomes due). Fiscal problems would become more acute; the government may be forced to issue IOUs, which effectively become a parallel currency to the euro. A new currency by the central bank of Greece is likely to eventually become necessary to inject both liquidity and recapitalise banks. At this stage, we would expect IOUs to be converted into the new Greek drachma (NGD).

The NGD would likely depreciate significantly and hence many local companies (clearly those in the non-tradable sector) and households would need to default on their foreign currency debt, now including euro-denominated liabilities. Many of the domestic contracts that are now denominated in euros would also become unviable and need to be restructured. Non-performing loans would surge because of: 1) the negative balance sheet effects for firms and households; and 2) the local currency needed to pay euro debts would increase with the devaluation, exceeding the increase in local currency revenue. Likewise, the government would also be forced to default on its euro-denominated liabilities.

Redenomination away from the euro would also cause massive transfers between agents, adding to the above-mentioned transfers between debtors and creditors. A majority of households with local accounts and savings will suffer substantial losses while cash rich agents with accounts abroad will be the big winners and could take advantage of the chaos to seize capital and production capacities. Given the weak state of the government, these redistributions would likely benefit the already oversized unofficial sector.

In short, the existing contracting framework and financial infrastructure would be broken and need to be rebuilt. Inflationary finance would likely be used, to some extent at least, to replace the official finance that now supports Greece. Politically difficult fiscal and structural reforms would still be required to make the country more competitive, and promote economic growth.

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From RBC:

In a normal referendum the next steps would be binary––something happens or it doesn’t. But this is no ordinary referendum.

We argued last week that the next steps for a ‘no’ or a ‘yes’ vote look superficially similar. The government and creditors will have to start negotiations on a third programme (since the second one expired on Tuesday). Both sides indicated they were willing to do so even in the event of a ‘no’.

What happens on Monday?

Various European-level meetings are expected to take place. These include a EuroWorking Group meeting (i.e. top-level officials from euro area finance ministries). This may then be followed by a eurogroup teleconference (i.e. finance ministers-level) to take stock of the situation. At the Leaders’ level, German Chancellor Merkel will meet French President Hollande for a bilateral in Paris, with both calling for a European Council summit to follow on Tuesday. Separate from the political proceedings, the ECB’s Governing Council is also expected to meet to discuss Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) for the Greek banking sector, though this meeting has not yet been confirmed.

The first thing to watch is how Syriza responds

On Thursday, Greek Prime Minister Tsipras claimed in the event of a ‘no’ outcome, he would be in Brussels within 48 hours signing a deal. In practice that is almost impossible––any new deal will need a lot of technical work so at best is a few weeks away. But in the first 48 hours there should be some sign of what willingness there is to compromise on both sides. If Tsipras takes a defiant tone (citing the democratic choice of the Greek people) we expect Europeans leaders to respond that they are also democratically elected (as they did after the January election). In that case we would expect the market reaction to worsen.

The second thing to watch is how the ECB responds

The Governing Council is expected to meet on Monday to take stock of the situation. A Greek government spokesperson revealed that the Central Bank of Greece would submit a request to the ECB for a further increase to the ELA facility limit, which currently stands at €89.4bn. This follows from various press reports, including Bloomberg, indicating that Greek banks were struggling to cope with deposit withdrawals even with the capital controls already in place. Note that prior to the weekend, the head of Greece’s banking association, Louka Katseli, said that ‘liquidity is assured until Monday, thereafter it will depend on the ECB decision.” She added that the liquidity cushion banks currently had stood at about EUR 1bn.

We nevertheless consider there to be limited prospect of further extension to ELA at this stage, with the risks instead skewed towards the Governing Council restricting access to the facility, including by increasing collateral requirements further. An increase to the ELA limit was not a ‘given’ even if the referendum had yielded a ‘yes’ outcome, and as such a ‘no’ vote makes that decision even more difficult, in our view. Recall that ELA lending requires banks to post “adequate collateral”, and may only be provided to “illiquid but solvent” institutions. In the current environment, whether such conditions are satisfied is predicated in part on a judgment about the likelihood of a new financial assistance programme being agreed for the Greek sovereign.

Does this mean euro exit?

A ‘no’ outcome certainly increases the risk. This is particularly the case if the Greek government believes that it will have substantially more bargaining power with the institutions and brings more ‘red lines’ to the negotiating table. Much will depend on the tenor of discussions when they begin next week.

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From Deutsche Bank

There are three near-term implications of the results.

First, the vote marks a big political victory for PM Tsipras. Today's vote will allow the PM to maintain the political initiative within Greece, re-enforcing his leadership within the party as well as the government. It will be perceived by the government as a strong backing around its tough negotiating strategy.

Second, the poll masks a deeply divided electoral body. The win to the "no" vote was decisive. But opinion polls over the last few days have continued to show an overwhelming support for euro membership. How this can be reconciled with the "no" vote and rising economic costs remains to be seen in coming days. Either way, the referendum process itself and the outcome has increased polarization in Greece. Political tension both within parliament and in potential political demonstrations will be ongoing and unpredictable.

Third, the referendum result now requires Europe to more formally adopt a position on Greece, particularly given the size of the "no". The European message on whether rejection is equivalent to Eurozone exit has not been consistent, with both Merkel and Schauble in particular not adopting this interpretation. A more clear reaction from Eurozone members should now be expected.

Next steps

In coming hours, the focus will shift back to the European response.

Most imminently, Greek bank ELA liquidity is likely to be fully exhausted over the next few days, leading to an exhaustion of ATM cash reserves as well as an inability to finance imported goods via outgoing payments. The hit to the economy will be big. The Bank of Greece is holding a conference call with the Greek banks this evening to discuss the liquidity situation.

The ECB is scheduled to meet tomorrow morning to decide on ELA policy. An outright suspension would effectively put the banking system into immediate resolution and would be a step closer to Eurozone exit. All outstanding Greek bank ELA liquidity (and hence deposits) would become immediately due and payable to the Bank of Greece. The maintenance of ELA at the existing level is the most likely outcome, at least until the European political reaction has materialized. This will in any case materially increase the pressure on the economy in coming days.

On the political front, focus will now shift to whether the damaged relationship between Greece and Europe's creditors can be repaired and the immediate prospect of a resumption in negotiations. PM Tsipras last week officially applied for a 3rd ESM program, but the application was rejected pending the outcome of the referendum..

The risk is that relationships between Europe and Greece have been damaged to such an extent, that additional conditions are set before negotiations around an ESM program can be initiated. The overall ESM process will in any case take time. An ESM program requires prior ECB/IMF assessment of financing needs/debt sustainability as well as Bundestag parliamentary approval before talks around a staff-level agreement can begin.

In the meantime, political developments within Greece will be just as important. The PM's commitment to re-start negotiations will be tested tonight and tomorrow morning..

The opposition, in the meantime, has been weakened. Influential New Democracy party member Bakoyiannis is reported this evening to have asked for former PM Samaras' resignation to allow the party to re-group. The prospect of ongoing and unpredictable shifts in politics cannot be ruled out over the course of the next few weeks given rising pressure on the economy.

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